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WHEN GOOD POLICIES GO BAD: CONTROLLING 
RISKS POSED BY FLAWED INCENTIVE-BASED 
COMPENSATION
NICOLE VINCENT*
ABSTRACT
The recent Wells Fargo scandal revealed the harm that can result from flawed 
incentive-based compensation arrangements. Large financial institutions have both a 
legal and an ethical obligation to ensure that any incentive-based compensation 
arrangements that are in place will not encourage risky or fraudulent employee 
behavior. The continued existence of inappropriate and poorly structured
arrangements demonstrates that existing regulations are inadequate to ensure 
compliance and protect consumers. Regulations should include increased penalties 
and should more evenly distribute the burden of oversight and compliance between 
the public and private sectors. In addition to regulatory reform, the government should 
prosecute culpable high-level executives more aggressively. Arguably, white-collar 
criminals are in a position to be more effectively deterred by the threat of incarceration 
than other types of criminals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a scandal broke in the financial sector when the media revealed that 
Wells Fargo employees had been opening new bank accounts for existing customers 
without their knowledge.1 Since then, former Wells Fargo employees have explained 
that the high-pressure atmosphere, specifically related to flawed incentive-based 
compensation arrangements, led many of them to fraudulently open these accounts for 
fear of losing their jobs if they failed to meet goals set by the company.2 Large 
financial institutions have both a legal and an ethical obligation to ensure that any 
incentive-based compensation arrangements that are in place will not encourage risky 
or fraudulent employee behavior at the expense of consumers. The ongoing existence 
of these inappropriate, poorly structured incentive-based compensation arrangements 
demonstrates that existing regulations are inadequate to ensure compliance and protect 
consumers. Therefore, the government should reform existing regulations, prosecute 
white-collar criminals more aggressively, or undertake some combination of both to 
address this problem.
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act3 in 2010 to promote financial stability by, among other measures, protecting 
consumers from “abusive financial services practices.”4 In 2011, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Credit Union Administration, and the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Agencies”) published a joint notice of 
proposed rulemaking.5 The purpose of the proposed rulemaking was to implement § 
5641(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the appropriate regulators to prohibit 
any type of incentive-based compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate 
                                                          
1 Renae Merle, Wells Fargo Boots 5,300 Employees for Creating Accounts Its Customers 
Didn’t Ask for, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/09/08/wells-fargo-fined-185-
million-for-creating-accounts-its-customers-didnt-ask-for/.
2 Matt Egan, Workers Tell Wells Fargo Horror Stories, CNN (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/09/investing/wells-fargo-phony-accounts-culture/.
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010).
4 Id.
5 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed 
Apr. 14, 2011).
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risks by financial institutions covered by the Act.6 However, since the proposed rule 
was published, incentive-based compensation practices in the financial services 
industry have evolved.7 Due to those changes, the Agencies proposed a new rule in 
June 2016 to revise the proposed rule published in 2011 and more effectively 
implement § 5641(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.8
While the 2016 proposed amendments are a step in the right direction toward 
ending flawed incentive-based compensation practices, because they include punitive 
features such as a clawback provision and stricter deferral requirements, more action 
and harsher penalties are needed to protect consumers. This Note will argue that 
executives in financial institutions should face criminal prosecution more frequently 
to serve as a deterrent. This is necessary because in light of the benefit to the bottom 
line these arrangements can offer the corporation, the prospect of incarceration may 
be the only punishment stringent enough to deter executives from implementing or 
approving these risky incentive-based compensation arrangements.9 Additionally, the 
Agencies should modify the proposed new rule to impose more significant penalties 
on executive officers or significant risk-takers, such as heightened clawback10
requirements, deferral provisions, and forfeiture.11 The threat of meaningful 
punishment would further the deterrent effect intended by this proposed regulation. In 
addition to modifying the new rule, new regulatory solutions should be considered to 
improve efficiency in compliance and ensure meaningful enforcement.
Before turning to the new proposals, this Note will first examine the evolution of 
these types of incentive-based arrangements, mainly focusing on arrangements within 
large financial institutions; compare and contrast effective arrangements and risky 
ones; and offer solutions to the dangers posed by improper incentive-based 
arrangements. In Section II, this Note will look at incentive-based compensation 
arrangements and examine their characteristics, explaining how well-structured 
incentive-based compensation arrangements can benefit a company. Section II then 
will explore how flawed arrangements can expose a company to risk. In Section III, 
this Note will review the history and evolution of rules and regulations that have been 
put in place in an attempt to cure the problems caused by risky incentive-based 
compensation arrangements. This Note will highlight the role of penalties in the 
regulations aimed at these arrangements. In Section IV, this Note will discuss the 
                                                          
6 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (2018) states that “the appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly 
prescribe regulations or guidelines that prohibit any types of incentive-based payment 
arrangements, or any feature of any such arrangement, that the regulators determine encourages 
inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions . . . .”
7 Madeline Marsden, Incentive Compensation and Proposed Rules, FED. RES. BANK 
ATLANTA (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.frbatlanta.org/economy-matters/banking-and-
finance/viewpoint/2016/11/03/incentive-compensation-and-proposed-rules.
8 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670 (proposed June 10, 
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42).
9 See infra Section II.
10 “Clawback” provisions allow the company to take back compensation it has paid out. 
Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37731 (defining “clawback” as 
a “mechanism by which a covered institution can recover vested incentive-based compensation 
from a covered person.”); see infra note 51.
11 See infra Section V.
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factors that have resulted in the persistence of flawed arrangements despite the rules 
and regulations enacted to thwart them. Section IV also examines recent problems 
caused by persisting problems.
In Section V, this Note will propose solutions. It will argue that deterrence should 
be the goal of regulation and prosecution in this field. The government should 
prosecute executives who implement or ratify risky compensation arrangements more 
aggressively, as the government can accomplish deterrence through the threat of 
certain (if brief) incarceration. Corporate criminal liability could offer a similar 
deterrent effect as individual liability but with fewer evidentiary hurdles (though it 
should not be viewed as a substitute). In the regulatory realm, the proposed rule should 
require stricter penalties for executives who violate it, and those penalties should target 
the executives’ salaries through deferral and clawback provisions. Beyond reforming 
current regulations, this Note will propose significant changes to the regulatory 
scheme to better account for the unique characteristic of the banking sector. If the 
private and public sectors work together to write applicable regulations, benefits 
accrue to both parties in the form of lower compliance costs and the conservation of 
government resources. Further, a form of self-policing by members of the financial 
sector could enhance current oversight and reduce the risk of superficial compliance 
by institutions. Finally, this Note will offer a brief conclusion and look to the future.
II. BACKGROUND: WHY HAVE INCENTIVE-BASED ARRANGEMENTS?
The details of incentive-based compensation arrangements may vary between 
institutions, but generally, all adhere to the principle of payment based on outcomes.12
For example, a company will pay an employee a bonus if he meets a certain sales goal, 
thereby providing him with an incentive to sell more of the company’s product. 
Examining the benefits that a company and an individual employee can gain though 
an appropriately risk-minimized arrangement is useful to understanding the need for 
regulating incentive-based compensation arrangements.
A. Benefits of Appropriate Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements
Financial institutions competing for talent may find that incentive arrangements 
are necessary to attract and retain desirable employees.13 Well-structured 
arrangements can benefit a company by promoting better performance of the 
institution and individual employees.14 They can promote the health of a financial 
institution by aligning the interests of executives and employees with those of the 
                                                          
12 See Stephen Bryan et al., CEO Compensation After Deregulation: The Case of Electric 
Utilities, 78 J. BUS. 1709, 1710 (2005); Andrew Weiss, Incentives and Worker Behavior: Some 
Evidence 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2194, 1987) (explaining that
“[b]ecause each employee is paid in accordance with his own output, a payment schedule can 
be chosen to induce the optimal level of effort on the part of employees.”).
13 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37673.
14 Id.; Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can 
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 128 (2010) (arguing that incentives are valuable because they tie the executive’s salary to 
the corporation’s wealth, rather than a fixed salary in which the only incentive for the executive 
is to keep his or her job).
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institution’s shareholders and other stakeholders.15 Simply put, rewarding employees 
of the financial institution for performance that benefits shareholders of the institution 
can benefit both employees and institutions.
B. Risks Posed by Flawed Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements
On the other hand, incentive-based compensation arrangements can harm an 
institution if the associated risks are not properly managed. If an employee’s salary is 
made up largely of incentive payment, to the point that the employee depends on those 
incentives as a part of his subsistence, then the employee no longer feels that the 
incentive is a nice bonus if he makes his sales goals, but rather that he must make his 
sales goal no matter what or that he feels pressure from the company to do so.16 In the 
case of Wells Fargo, for example, workers reported that they faced intense pressure to 
meet sales quotas from the management and were even threatened with termination if 
they failed to sell enough products to customers.17 Further, large financial institutions 
carry risks of negative externalities because they are interconnected with other 
financial institutions, other companies, and even other markets.18 Large banks are key 
players in many market segments such as private securitization and derivatives and 
leveraged investor financing.19 If a large bank fails or experiences significant financial 
problems, it can start a domino effect that depresses share prices across those markets 
and related ones.20 Therefore, the negative impact from inappropriate risk-taking can 
affect more than just the shareholders of the financial institution with a flawed 
arrangement; it can affect the health of the United States economy as a whole.21 For 
                                                          
15 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37673–74; Caywood, 
supra note 14, at 128; Vincent K. Chong & Ian R.C. Eggleton, The Impact of Reliance on 
Incentive-Based Compensation Schemes, Information Asymmetry and Organisational 
Commitment on Managerial Performance, 18 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 312, 312–13 (2007)
(discussing the idea that compensation schemes are based on an agency theory framework and 
that dysfunctional behaviors arise when the agent and the principal have different risk 
preferences and conflicting goals based on information asymmetry).
16 See Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo’s Post-Scandal Pay Plan Eliminates Sales Goals,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-10/wells-
fargo-unveils-retail-bank-pay-plan-in-response-to-scandal. Keller reports that Wells Fargo’s 
new compensation plan “will skew more heavily toward base salary and less toward variable 
bonuses,” and the company will base incentives on customer service rather than the number of 
products sold. Id.
17 Planet Money: The Wells Fargo Hustle, NPR (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/10/07/497084491/episode-728-the-wells-fargo-
hustle. A former Wells Fargo employee states that in 2009, her managers threatened to fire her 
and put a mark on her permanent record if she did not meet her sales quota. Id.
18 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37674.
19 MARC LABONTE, CONG. RES. SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG 
TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 4; see George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulations,
16 CATO J. 17, 17–18 (1996) (stating that bank failures are perceived to be more harmful than 
other firms’ failures because of their potential for an effect “throughout the banking system . . . 
.”).
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these reasons, reducing the risks posed by incentive-based compensation 
arrangements is essential.
III. POST-CRISIS REGULATION
A. Initial Agency and Congressional Actions
Although these incentive systems can serve to align employee and shareholder 
interests, flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements were identified as one 
of the contributing factors to the financial crisis that began in 2007.22 To address these 
practices, in 2010, the Federal Banking Agencies23 adopted a Guidance on Sound 
Incentive Compensation Policies based on three principles for improved incentive 
compensation practices.24 According to these three principles, the institution should 
provide employees incentives that appropriately balance risk and reward, the 
incentives should comport with effective controls and risk-management, and, finally, 
the incentive programs should be supported by strong corporate governance, including 
active and effective oversight by the organization’s board of directors.25 While the 
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies briefly mentioned penalties for 
officials of the institution, it mainly focused on supervisory policy.26
Additionally, in late 2009, the Federal Reserve initiated a multi-disciplinary, 
horizontal review of incentive compensation practices at twenty-five large, complex 
banking organizations,27 citing that one of its goals was to help each agency implement 
the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies.28 In its 2011 report on the 
Horizontal Review, the Reserve noted that each institution could do more to promote 
sound incentive-based compensation policies.29
In 2010, Congress established the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 
in 12 U.S.C. § 5491 to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial 
                                                          
22 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37674 (noting that 
the foundation of sound risk management was undermined by the actions of employees who 
were in a position to expose institutions to financial risk and sought to maximize their own 
compensation through arrangements that failed to align employees’ interests with that of the 
institution); see generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (discussing 
compensation arrangements that rewarded employees, including non-executives, for increasing 
an institution’s short-term profit without sufficient recognition of the risks posed to the 
institution and the market as a whole).
23 Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395–96 (June 25, 
2010). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Office of Thrift 
Supervision, Treasury are the Agencies behind the guidance. Id.
24 Id. at 36396.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 36397.
27 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES: A
REPORT ON THE HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1
(2011).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/8
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products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”30 The statute requires 
CFPB to present an annual report to Congress regarding consumer complaints 
involving financial products and services received by the Bureau.31 As an executive 
agency, the CFPB is empowered to make and enforce regulations.32
1. Dodd-Frank and Implementation
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.33 It was meant, in part, to prevent 
excessive risk-taking of the sort that led to the financial crisis in 2008.34 The Dodd-
Frank Act specifically recognizes that incentive-based compensation arrangements 
pose a danger, as the Act contains certain provisions aimed at regulating compensation 
arrangements.35 One provision has a prescription that regulations require covered 
financial institutions to disclose the structures of their incentive-based compensation 
arrangements to the appropriate federal regulator to determine whether the 
arrangements could lead to material financial loss at the institution.36 Another 
provision requires regulations prohibiting any type of incentive-based compensation 
arrangement that the regulators determine “encourages” inappropriate risks by a 
covered institution.37
2. The First Proposed Rule
In order to implement (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and supplement existing efforts 
to curb flawed arrangements, the Agencies proposed a rule in 2011.38 This proposed 
rule would have required that arrangements be consistent with the three principles 
described in the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies: they should 
balance risk and financial rewards, they should be compatible with effective risk 
                                                          
30 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2018); see About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) (stating that 
the Bureau’s aim is to strengthen the economy by protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive practices and taking legal action against companies that violate the law).
31 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(C) (2018).
32 Guide to Administrative Law, LIB. CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php (last updated June 9, 2015).
33 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780).
34 See Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
35 See 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2018).
36 Id. § 5641(a)(1)(B). Section (A) states that an additional purpose for disclosure of the 
arrangements is to determine whether the arrangement “provides an executive officer, 
employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial institution with excessive 
compensation, fees, or benefits . . . .” Id. § 5641(a)(1)(A).
37 Id. § 5641(b).
38 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed 
Apr. 14, 2011).
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management controls, and they should be accompanied by strong corporate 
governance.39
In order to balance risk and reward, the rule proposed adjusting the amount of the 
compensation award to reflect the risk that person’s activities pose to the institution; 
deferring actual payment of the award until after the end of the performance period, 
with the award adjusted for losses to the company that may become apparent during 
the deferral period; and extending performance periods to better assess risk 
outcomes.40 The rule would have prohibited arrangements that would encourage 
employees to expose the institution to improper risks in pursuit of excessive 
compensation.41 For larger financial institutions,42 the rule would have required 
deferral of fifty percent of the incentive-based compensation for executive officers for 
a period of three years.43 To be compatible with risk management controls, the rule 
proposed that institutions have risk-management personnel that help to design the 
compensation arrangements and a system in place for monitoring those personnel.44
For strong corporate governance, the rule would have required oversight by the board 
of directors and even stated that the board would be “ultimately responsible for 
ensuring that the covered financial institution’s incentive compensation arrangements 
are appropriately balanced.”45 The proposed rule also contained an anti-evasion 
section, prohibiting institutions from evading the restrictions of the rule by indirect 
acts, or acts through another entity, that would be unlawful if done directly—such as 
classifying employees as independent contractors to circumvent the rule.46
Most comments on the 2011 proposed rule urged stronger discouragement for 
risky compensation practices, such as imposing a longer deferral period for executive 
bonuses, basing compensation practices on factors such as an institution’s bond price 
or spread on credit default swaps, and including more disclosure requirements.47
                                                          
39 Id. at 21178–79.
40 Id. at 21179.
41 Id. at 21204 § 42.5(b). The proposed rule states that compensation would be excessive 
when “amounts paid are unreasonable or disproportionate to, among other things, the amount, 
nature, quality, and scope of services performed by the covered person.” Id. at 21178. The 
factors to be considered when making this determination include “[a]ny connection between the 
individual and any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse 
. . . .” Id.
42 For financial institutions, this term means covered institutions with total consolidated 
assets of $50 billion or more. Id. at 21173.
43 Id. at 21180.
44 Id. at 21179. The rule notes that these controls are important because employees may 
seek to increase their own individual compensation by inappropriately influencing “the risk 
measures, information, or judgments used to balance” the employee’s compensation. Id. at 
21180.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 21183.
47 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37677 (proposed 
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42). These types of comments generally came 
from private individuals, community groups, members of Congress, labor federations, and 
pension funds. Id.
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Comments from covered financial institutions and financial industry associations 
favored guidelines rather than rules to implement the Dodd-Frank Act, and some 
opposed the deferral provisions, suggesting they would harm an institution’s ability to 
attract and retain key employees.48
Following the 2011 proposed rule, foreign jurisdictions implemented a number of 
rules to address compensation practices, most of which were stronger than the 2011 
proposed rule.49 Some covered financial institutions operate in both foreign and 
domestic markets and therefore are subject to the rules of every jurisdiction in which 
the institution meets the standard for coverage.50 In June 2013, the European Union 
adopted rules requiring, among other measures, that up to one hundred percent of the 
variable remuneration shall be subject to clawback.51 The potential for an executive to 
lose compensation that he has already received presents a significant deterrent effect 
for engaging in risky behavior. Numerous jurisdictions with heavy financial presence, 
including Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, adopted similarly enhanced rules and 
guidelines.52
B. Evolving Needs in Regulating Compensation Arrangements
Because of the international evolution in compensation practices, the Agencies 
recognized the need for consistency between United States and foreign rules53 and 
therefore proposed a new rule in June 2016.54 This new proposed rule was based on 
the 2011 proposed rule; it retained the three key principles, but made changes to reflect 
international developments in incentive compensation policies.55
                                                          
48 Id.
49 Id. at 37678.
50 Id. at 37677–78.
51 See Council Directive 2013/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 94(n)(1), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 389.
52 For example, in Canada, see OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST. CORP.
GOVERNANCE, GUIDELINES (2013) (promulgating guidelines for the large institutions regulated 
by Canada’s OSFI), but see John Tuzyk & Faye Ghadiani, Canadian Clawbacks: Increasing 
but Still Voluntary, BLAKES (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.blakes.com/English/Resources/Bulletins/Pages/Details.aspx?BulletinID=1867 
(noting that Canada does not legislatively mandate clawbacks rendering them unenforceable 
under contract law; however, clawback provisions have become more prevalent in Canada 
likely due to the influence of the OSFI guidelines). In Switzerland, see FINMA Publishes 
Circular on Renumeration Schemes, FINMA (Nov. 10, 2009), 
https://finma.ch/en/news/2009/11/mm-rs-verguetungssysteme-20091111/ (noting that 
Switzerland’s Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”) “welcomes ‘clawback’ and 
‘malus’ arrangements.”), but see FINMA Redefines Corporate Governance Guidelines for 
Banks, FINMA (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/11/20161101-mm-rs-
corporate-governance-bei-banken/ (noting that FINMA decided not to introduce a clawback 
clause in the updated “Remuneration schemes” circular).
53 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37678.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 37679; see supra note 38.
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As part of the risk/reward balance, the new rule would apply the three-year deferral 
period to “significant risk-takers” in addition to the executive officers already included 
in the 2011 proposed rule,56 thereby applying these safeguards more broadly. Deferred 
compensation is compensation that is paid to the employee at a later date than which 
it is earned.57 The new rule includes forfeiture and downward adjustment provisions 
that would subject unvested, deferred compensation awards to reduction if certain 
adverse outcomes were to occur.58 Significantly, the new rule would also require 
clawback provisions in arrangements for senior executive officers and significant risk-
takers.59 Clawbacks are mechanisms “by which a covered institution can recover 
vested incentive-based compensation from a senior executive officer or significant 
risk-taker if certain events occur.”60 Officers or significant risk-takers would trigger 
these mechanisms if they engaged in misconduct resulting in significant financial or 
reputational harm, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used to 
determine their incentive-based compensation.61
Regarding strong corporate governance, the new proposed rule required that the 
board of directors obtain a written assessment of the institution’s incentive-based 
compensation arrangements, including the institution’s risk control and compliance 
policies.62 Yet, the 2011 proposed rule’s disclosure and recordkeeping requirements 
were less detailed than those of the 2016 proposed rule.63
                                                          
56 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37680.
57 See Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the 
Structure of Executive Remuneration, 38 J. FIN. 1489, 1489 (1983) (stating that “[t]o relate an 
executive’s reward more closely to his performance, firms can delay a large component of 
compensation until better information is available, so that the amount of remuneration becomes 
dependent upon indicators of performance.”).
58 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37804, § 42.7(b)(2)(i). 
The adverse outcomes are:
(i) Poor financial performance attributable to a significant deviation from the [covered 
institution’s] risk parameters set forth in the covered institution’s policies and 
procedures; (ii) Inappropriate risk-taking, regardless of the impact on financial 
performance; (iii) Material risk management or control failures; (iv) Non-compliance 
with statutory, regulatory, or supervisory standards results in: (A) Enforcement or legal 
action . . . brought by a federal or state regulator or agency; or (B) A requirement that 
the covered institution report a restatement of a financial statement to correct a material 
error; and (v) Other aspects of conduct or poor performance as defined by the covered 
institution.
Id. at 37804–05, § 42.7(b)(2)(ii)–(v).
59 Id. at 37805, § 42.7(c).
60 Id. at 37681.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 37806, § 42.10.
63 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed 
Apr. 14, 2011).
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C. Current State of Regulation
The federal government’s response to problems with incentive-based 
compensation arrangements have been largely regulatory. The CFPB serves as a 
(weak) outside source of oversight on financial institutions.64 The proposed rules to 
implement Dodd-Frank’s reporting requirements and prohibitions on risk-prone 
arrangements focus on controlling risks through internal supervision and balancing 
risk and reward.65 The 2016 rule proposed heightened penalty provisions that would 
be imposed if undesirable outcomes occur as a result of flawed arrangements and 
notably recognizes the need for an anti-evasion provision.66 Although this evolution 
suggests that the government has recognized the problems with relying on institutional 
self-governance, current and proposed regulations do not impose strong enough 
penalties to de-incentivize risky compensation arrangements. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider further measures to address these risks, both by modifying the 
current proposed rule and by implementing structural regulatory changes to encourage 
more efficiency and interaction between the regulatory bodies and the financial 
institutions being regulated.
IV. CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH INCENTIVE-BASED ARRANGEMENTS
Despite currently enforced rules and the specter of future regulations, recent events 
demonstrate that financial institutions are able to continue implementing incentive-
based compensation practices that expose the company to significant risks and fail to 
align the interests of employees with those of both the shareholders and the larger 
market affected by the institution. Such arrangements can also affect consumers, 
especially if sales goals pressure employees to sell customers banking products they 
may not want or need.
A. The Wells Fargo Example
The scandals involving Wells Fargo provide an example of the persistent problem 
with risky compensation arrangements and lack of internal oversight. Employees at 
Wells Fargo engaged in “cross-selling,” or selling additional products to the same 
customer.67 Cross-selling is attractive to banks because acquiring new customers is 
much more expensive than retaining existing ones and simply selling more products 
to those existing customers is more profitable.68 Of course, cross-selling relies on the 
bank’s employees to sell the additional products to their customer.69 The employees 
must go beyond simply meeting the customers’ banking demands and convince them 
                                                          
64 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-
agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
65 See, e.g., Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37711.
66 Id. at 37690.
67 Yasar F. Jarrar & Andy Neely, Cross-Selling in the Financial Sector: Customer 
Profitability Is Key, 10 J. TARGETING MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MARKETING 282, 282 
(2002).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 287.
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to buy more products,70 such as additional accounts, credit cards, or home-equity 
loans.
In the wake of the news that Wells Fargo employees had opened thousands of sham 
accounts71—accounts existing customers had neither asked for nor even knew were 
being opened in their names—employees have begun to comment on the immense 
pressure to sell “solutions” and hit sales goals for which they would receive bonuses.72
Employees reported that they were expected to sell eight new products per day, which 
was then raised to twenty new products per day; if they did not hit their goals, Wells 
Fargo would threaten them with termination.73 This intense pressure to hit sales goals 
resulted in extremely risky and fraudulent conduct—the opening of the sham 
accounts—because employees were unable to meet such exacting goals legitimately.74
Employees were tacitly encouraged to commit fraud while the CEO looked the other 
way.75
B. The Aftermath of Wells Fargo
After the sham accounts came to light, Wells Fargo fired over five thousand 
employees.76 The organization fired only one area president, meaning the vast majority 
of those fired were low-level employees.77 While no one would argue that those 
employees who committed the fraudulent acts should not have been fired, arguably 
those in positions of oversight should have been punished as well. The CFPB ordered 
Wells Fargo to pay restitution to all victims, a $100 million fine to the CFPB’s Civil 
Penalty Fund, a $35 million penalty to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
                                                          
70 Id. at 287–88 (emphasizing that employee sales skills are essential to cross-selling 
success and that managers must discipline customer-service representatives to “discuss the 
benefits of full account coverage” and “take ownership of the customer.” (footnote omitted)).
71 In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFBP-0015, states that the Bureau 
concluded that Wells Fargo employees opened 1,534,280 accounts “that may not have been 
authorized and that may have been funded through simulated funding, or transferring funds 
from consumers’ existing accounts without their knowledge or consent.” Id. at *5.
72 See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Warned Workers Against Sham 
Accounts, but ‘They Needed a Paycheck’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-warned-workers-
against-fake-accounts-but-they-needed-a-paycheck.html; see also Planet Money, supra note 17.
73 Planet Money, supra note 17.
74 See Corkery & Cowley, supra note 72.
75 See Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A. Kingson, Wells Fargo to Claw Back $75 Million from 
2 Former Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/wells-fargo-pay-executives-accounts-
scandal.html.
76 Laura J. Keller et al., Wells Fargo’s Stars Thrived While 5,000 Workers Got Fired,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-03/wells-
fargo-s-stars-climbed-while-abuses-flourished-beneath-them.
77 Id.
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and $50 million to the City and County of Los Angeles.78 In relation to Wells Fargo’s
revenue,79 these fines are negligible.
CEO John Stumpf appeared in front of the Senate Banking Committee and the 
House Financial Services Committee, where members of Congress from both political 
parties sharply criticized him for the scandal.80 After pressure from the Senate 
Committee, the board of directors of Wells Fargo announced that it would claw back 
$41 million of Stumpf’s pay in the form of unvested stock awards.81 The board has 
since announced Stumpf’s decision to retire.82 He will be entitled to a $24 million 
supplemental cash balance plan.83 Considering his salary, these measures are hardly 
punitive.84 However, in April 2017, Wells Fargo’s board announced it would claw 
back an additional $75 million in compensation from Stumpf and the former head of 
community banking, Carrie L. Tolstedt.85 These clawbacks are the largest in banking 
history.86 Wells Fargo also released a “Sales Practices Investigation Report” at the 
time of the clawbacks87 that stated the “root cause of sales practice failures was the 
distortion of [Wells Fargo’s] sales culture and performance management system, 
which, when combined with aggressive sales management, created pressure on 
employees to sell unwanted or unneeded products to customers . . . .”88
                                                          
78 In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFBP-0015.
79 Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wells-fargo-
points-to-the-failure-of-regulation.
80 Bob Bryan, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Got Raked over the Coals by Congress for 
over 4 Hours, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/wells-fargo-ceo-
john-stumpf-house-financial-services-congress-hearing-2016-9.
81 Geoff Colvin, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s $41 Million ‘Clawback’ Isn’t What It 
Appears, FORTUNE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/03/john-stumpf-wells-fargo-
clawback/.
82 Matt Krantz, Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf Retires with $134M, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-ceo-retires-under-
fire/91964778/.
83 Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Mar. 16, 2016). The 
supplemental cash balance plan provides benefits in addition to the standard pension awards 
and may provide benefits in excess of Internal Revenue Code limits. Id. at 64–65.
84 See id. at 39; Nomi Prins, Opinion, Ex-Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Deserves Jail—
Not a Plush Retirement, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/14/john-stumpf-retirement-wells-
fargo-ceo-jail-time (reporting that “[f]or his penance, all Stumpf had to do was forfeit [$41 
million] in restricted stock awards,” while his exit payout is currently valued at around $134 
million).
85 See Cowley & Kingson, supra note 75.
86 Id.
87 See generally INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES 
INVESTIGATION REPORT (2017), https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-
relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf.
88 Id. at Overview.
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At present, it does not appear the government will pursue criminal charges against 
Stumpf. Before the Wells Fargo scandal, in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008, 
the government engaged in very little criminal prosecution.89 Private litigation 
between shareholders or injured customers in lieu of government prosecution may 
serve to restore the plaintiffs, but it also often ends in settlements rather than judicial 
opinions, which can provide guidance as to the legality of the institution’s behavior.90
Arguably, even if the proposed rule had been implemented, it would not have 
prevented the scandal because the rule relies too heavily on internal self-policing—
and the outside watchdog groups, such as the CFPB, pale in size and resources 
compared to the institutions they are responsible for monitoring.91 Those in 
responsible positions also historically have not been subject to any meaningful 
criminal punishment in a way that would likely deter others from implementing such 
arrangements or at least provide incentives to make sure such arrangements were not 
ongoing. Therefore, solutions that rely on deterring executives from implementing 
flawed incentive systems through the threat of prosecution or significant monetary 
penalties, as well as regulatory solutions, will be more effective.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This Section proposes solutions through both criminal liability and regulatory 
changes, both with a focus on deterrence as the underlying theory. Deterrence through 
the threat of punitive measures is proposed as a solution to risky incentive systems 
because of the nature of these systems—they require significant planning and analysis 
and can be modified if problems arise. Therefore, executives responsible for 
implementing incentive systems have the opportunity to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of the sort that makes deterrence effective if the potential punishments are 
strong enough.
A. Deterrence Through Criminal Liability
Holding individuals such as executives and managers criminally liable for crimes 
proximately caused by bad policies for which they are responsible would effectively 
deter these individuals from ratifying incentive arrangements they know to be flawed. 
The threat of incarceration will be a more effective deterrent than the fines imposed 
by regulatory violations, and although harsh, incarceration is justified in light of the 
immense effect large financial institutions have on our economy. Relying on financial 
institutions themselves or agencies to monitor incentive-based compensation 
arrangements to ensure that they do not expose the company to risk is not an effective 
solution, as demonstrated both by historical evidence and a simple comparison of the 
relative size and resources of the institutions to the agencies tasked with monitoring 
                                                          
89 David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2014) (noting 
the “surprising dearth” of individual penalties and suggesting that the government has moved 
toward eschewing individual liability and endorsing entity liability).
90 Id. at 1414; James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo’s $142-Million Sham Accounts Settlement: 
What You Need to Know, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
wells-fargo-settlement-20170710-htmlstory.html.
91 See Davidson, supra note 79 (discussing the relative lopsidedness of the “watchdogs and 
those they watch” and noting that the CFPB’s budget is roughly $600 million a year, while 
Wells Fargo, just one of the many institutions the CFPB must monitor, pulls in revenues of more 
than $80 billion annually).
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them.92 Under current regulations, those in positions of power can, through willful 
blindness or superficial ethics and risk management training, insulate themselves from 
any fallout if the policies backfire.93
Deterrence, as a theory of punishment, seeks to prevent crime by punishing a 
wrongdoer and thus encourages those who might be tempted to commit the same crime 
to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of sorts, which leads them to refrain from crime.94
General deterrence seeks to deter others through the punishment of one defendant, 
while specific deterrence seeks to deter the defendant re-offending through 
punishment.95 Some scholars have suggested that deterrence as a theory of punishment 
is unsound because there is little to suggest, and indeed it seems unlikely, that the 
majority of criminals actually engage in a mental cost-benefit analysis prior to 
committing a crime.96
However, a white-collar criminal differs from a “street-crime” offender in a 
number of respects. Some of these key differences suggest that white-collar offenders, 
especially those in high-powered positions such as executives at financial institutions, 
can be effectively deterred.97 White-collar criminals, specifically high-level 
executives, are arguably much more likely than other criminals to engage in just the 
sort of cost-benefit analysis on which the theory of deterrence relies.98 While the 
majority of street crimes involve the offender making a quick, often physically 
affirmative choice of action within a short time frame, white-collar crimes are 
generally schemes requiring a series of (non-physical) choices over a moderate to 
                                                          
92 Id.
93 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 492 (2003) (stating that “firms engaged in legally 
prohibited, but potentially profitable, conduct can reduce or eliminate liability” while giving an 
“appearance of legitimacy to . . . stakeholders and the marketplace at large . . . by mimicking an 
effective compliance system, without reducing the incidence of prohibited conduct within the 
firm.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate 
Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, J. CORP. L. 949, 958 (2006).
94 See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed., 1843). 
Bentham states that in regard to the proportion between crimes and punishments, “[i]n matters 
of importance, every one calculates. Each individual calculates with more or less correctness, 
according to the degrees of his information, and the power of the motives which actuate him; 
but all calculate.” Id.
95 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (9th ed. 2012).
96 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953 (2003) (suggesting 
that deterrence fails because it rests on the faulty expectation that potential criminals both are 
aware of the law and make rational, self-interested choices.).
97 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
468 (1997). The authors state that “[m]ore than because of the threat of legal punishment, people 
obey the law . . . because they fear the disapproval of their social group if they violate the law . 
. . .” Id.
98 Richard. A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 409, 410 (1980).
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lengthy time frame.99 High-level officials will certainly play a role in designing and 
overseeing the incentive-based compensation arrangements within their company, and 
these roles likely present opportunities for deliberation and weighing of consequences, 
whether innocuous or criminal.
1. Why Individual Liability for High-Level Managers Is Appropriate
Criminal liability should be imposed on executives or managers in responsible 
positions of oversight for compensation arrangements. This is appropriate because (1) 
they are in positions to modify arrangements that encourage risky behavior, and (2) 
they generally stand to gain the most from these arrangements; therefore, the deterrent 
effect would balance the incentive to keep profitable (though risky) arrangements in 
place. While some form of punishment is certainly appropriate for lower-level 
employees who engage in significantly risky behavior, such as fraud, the best 
protection for consumers and the larger market will come through eliminating the 
flawed arrangements before lower-level employees engage in the risky behavior that 
the arrangements encourage.
CEOs and similarly situated executives at financial institutions are, like many 
white-collar criminals, in positions of trust.100 An agency relationship exists between 
executives (the principals) and the employees below them in the hierarchy of the 
institution (the agents).101 Because institutions have numerous principals with discrete 
interests, from CEOs to board members, who are significantly removed from the 
agents, the “acting-for” relationship between the two groups is much more 
asymmetrical and insulated than a traditional agency relationship.102
“Street-crime” offenders, such as those who perpetrate robbery or assault, harm 
their victims directly. White-collar offenders, in positions of trust, “induce victims to 
part with their money or property with lies, misrepresentations, and deceptions rather 
than with brute force.”103
Not taking the threat of punishment into account, the cost-benefit analysis for the 
individual may weigh in favor of commission of the crime (or concealment of the 
wrongdoing), whereas for the corporation, honesty would be more profitable long-
term.104 A significant penalty and a possibility of prosecution for an institutional 
                                                          
99 Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Causes of White-Collar Crime, 25 CRIMINOLOGY
949, 953 (1987).
100 See Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept 
of White-Collar Crime, 55 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 346, 347 (1990).
101 Id. at 354.
102 Id. at 349–50. Shapiro explains that “trust or fiduciary rules do not provide substantive 
guidance regarding the exercise of the myriad agency roles that proliferate in complex 
societies.” Id. at 350 (citations omitted); see Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the 
Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991).
103 See Shapiro, supra note 100, at 350. “Instead of cultivating mechanical technology to 
break into a secured building, trustee ‘burglars’ cultivate social technology to become trusted 
organizations . . . rich with opportunity for exploiting their positions for personal or corporate 
advantage.” Id.
104 See John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 728 (1982) (discussing a hypothetical scientist who unlawfully 
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officer in a responsible position would serve to de-incentivize the officer’s 
concealment of or willful insulation from the wrongdoing, thereby tipping the cost-
benefit analysis in favor of refraining.105
2. Corporate Criminal Liability
Although the theory of respondeat superior allows criminal liability to attach to a 
corporation for criminal acts performed by certain employees acting within the scope 
of their employment and on behalf of the corporation,106 punishing the corporation 
may result in collateral damage. A punitive fine imposed on a corporation may be 
passed on to innocent parties,107 such as to consumers in higher prices, to shareholders 
in reduced dividends, or, in extreme circumstances, to the destruction of the entire 
corporation.108 Each of these results can have a dampening effect on the market as a 
whole. In light of the gargantuan resources of these large financial institutions, most 
monetary punishments amount to little more than a bump in the road.109 However, that 
is not to say that corporate liability should be abandoned in favor of individual liability 
alone.110 Although corporate liability may not have a strong enough deterrent effect to 
tip the scales of the cost-benefit analysis on its own, it can be an effective addition to 
individual liability, especially in light of the damage corporate sanctions can have on 
consumer trust.111 Of course, punishment of an executive official will undoubtedly 
                                                          
conceals safety studies for a product to save her job, while the company would benefit more in 
the long-term from disclosure).
105 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2008),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf. The guidelines 
emphasize that “[b]ecause a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of 
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate 
wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if 
it relates to high-level corporate officers . . . .” Id.
106 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY & JENNIFER TAUB, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 24–25
(6th ed. 2011); see N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 
(1909).
107 W.B. Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV.
361, 405 (1977).
108 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing 
the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 947 (2005).
109 For example, the CFPB will require Wells Fargo to pay out $185 million in fines, which 
amounts to 3.3% of the $5.6 billion in net income Wells Fargo made in the second quarter of 
2016. See John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-has-
gone-wrong/ (characterizing enforcement actions as “issuing modest parking tickets for major 
frauds.”); but see Eric Holder, Don’t Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at A14 
(opining that corporate fines that are essentially death penalties for corporations harm “innocent 
Americans,” and “prosecutors must not give in to the pressures of the day and feel compelled 
to indict more corporations simply because they can.”).
110 See U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 9-28.200(B) (stating that “prosecutors 
should not limit their focus solely to individuals or the corporation, but should consider both as 
potential targets.”).
111 See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Says Customers Shied Away After Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
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have a detrimental effect on shareholders in the short term; in the long term, punishing 
offenders where deterrence is realistically possible and hopefully effective makes 
more sense. This supports the conclusion that punishment would be most effective for 
those individuals in responsible positions in the institution.
3. Sentencing for Optimal Deterrence
Punishments for corporations in the form of monetary penalties simply fail to have 
the same deterrent effect as the threat of even brief incarceration for an individual.112
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ tough stance on white-collar criminals reflects the 
idea that deterrence for white-collar criminals can best be achieved through certain 
(though often short) prison terms.113 Even before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984114
reduced sentencing disparities and abolished parole, partially in an effort to reduce 
“coddling” of white-collar criminals,115 courts have recognized that the certainty of 
prison time upon conviction is key to effectuate deterrence among white-collar 
defendants.116 The Guidelines’ designation of white-collar crime as “serious” and 
meriting prison time also reflects the idea that society is willing to recognize white-
collar crime as equally worthy of punishment as street crimes.117
                                                          
says-customers-shied-away-after-scandal.html; Aaron Klein, Wells Fargo Shakes Consumers’ 
Trust in Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-shakes-
consumers-trust-in-banks-1474561080; Jonnelle Marte, After Wells Fargo, Can You Trust Your 
Bank?, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-
there/wp/2016/09/20/after-wells-fargo-how-much-can-you-trust-your-bank/.
112 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some 
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (noting that monetary punishments for corporate 
criminal liability “simply do not engage the emotions in the way that confinement of a human 
being in a cell does.”).
113 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, at 8 (2009). The guidelines 
explain:
Under pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sentenced to probation at an 
inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes . . . that 
in the Commission’s view are “serious.” The Commission’s solution to this problem 
has been to write guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for which probation 
was frequently given and provide for at least a short period of imprisonment in such 
cases. The Commission concluded that the definite prospect of prison, even though the 
term may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent . . . .
Id.; see BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 106, at 695.
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–86 (2012).
115 See BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 106, at 694 (explaining that through the Sentencing 
Reform Act, Congress sought to address the coddling of white-collar defendants by sentencing 
judges who relied heavily on fines and probation).
116 Browder v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Or. 1975) (doubting that 
“deterrence will be . . .  effective until the ‘executive’ becomes convinced that if he embarks on 
a criminal adventure, he will be severely—though proportionately—punished. Certainty is the 
key.”).
117 See id. at 1046 (suggesting that white-collar criminals must expect equal or greater 
punishment than street criminals because “[t]he consequences of white collar property crime 
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4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Deferred Prosecution as Barriers to Deterrence
The biggest hurdle that comes with using criminal prosecution of responsible 
individuals as a deterrent is prosecutorial discretion. Even the threat of brief 
incarceration is likely enough to deter an individual from pursuing a criminal course 
of action; however, the problem lies where there is no certainty or even any reasonable 
probability that the individual will be prosecuted. When the executive has the 
perception that there is very little risk of prosecution for his role in his company’s 
improper incentive-based compensation schemes, he may indeed engage in the cost-
benefit analysis relied on by proponents of the deterrence theory. However, he may 
well come to the conclusion that the benefits that spring from highly profitable 
incentive schemes outweigh the slight risk of prosecution and the seemingly farfetched 
fear of prison time. Therefore, the government must allocate resources to investigating 
and consistently (or at least more than rarely) prosecuting the individuals in 
responsible positions for fraud resulting from incentive-based compensation schemes. 
Deterrence will not exist without a well-founded fear of real criminal charges.118
One form of prosecutorial discretion is deferred prosecution. Deferred prosecution 
is often relied on in white-collar and corporate crime cases,119 but fails to provide the 
same deterrent effect as direct prosecution.120 In a deferred prosecution, a prosecutor 
gets an indictment against an offender but defers prosecution if the offender 
cooperates, often by admitting wrongdoing and correcting the violations that led to the 
charges.121 If the prosecutor is satisfied that the offender has made the necessary 
changes, such as correcting the incentive-based compensation arrangements that 
                                                          
tend to reach a higher magnitude in direct proportion to the level of status and power held by 
the criminal involved.”); see generally Braithwaite, supra note 104.
118 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789,
1827–28 (2015).
119 From 2001 to 2014, there were sixty-six cases of deferred prosecution involving financial
institutions, including: Baystar Capital Management LLC (fraud), ConvergEx Group, LLC 
(securities fraud), Deutsche Bank AG (tax fraud), Diamondback Capital Management LLC 
(securities fraud), GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (FCPA), German Bank HVB (tax 
fraud), Jefferies Group LLC (fraud), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (antitrust), Louis Berger (fraud), 
Mellon Bank, N.A. (theft), Merrill Lynch (false statements), Mirant Energy Trading (false 
commodities reporting), NETeller PLC (illegal gambling), and Prudential Equity Group 
(securities fraud). Id. at 1816 n.110; see also Joseph Warin, 2014 Year-End Update on 
Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/18/2014-
year-end-update-on-corporate-deferred-prosecution-and-non-prosecution-agreements 
(reporting that “[t]he decade-long trend favoring the use of [deferred prosecution agreements] 
is expected to explode in 2015 . . . .”).
120 See Alan Vinegrad, Government Likely to Go After Corporations, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 
2003, at A27, A28; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333 (2007).
121 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864 
(2005).
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resulted in fraudulent behavior and possibly including payment of restitution, he may 
dismiss the indictment and forgo the attachment of criminal liability.122
Deferred prosecutions in white-collar crime and corporate crime cases have been 
on the rise since the Justice Department introduced formal standards for prosecuting 
corporations and added a focus on the authenticity of the offender’s cooperation.123
Deferred prosecutions are undesirable from a deterrence perspective for a number of 
reasons. First, if the corporation knows it can escape liability by fixing any compliance 
problems during the deferral period, little incentive exists to create compensation 
arrangements that comply in the first place.124 Second, deferred prosecution allows a 
company to avoid most of the bad publicity that results from a conviction (or at least 
from charges) because the indictment will likely be dismissed.125 Finally, the majority 
of deferred prosecution agreements with corporations result in no individual liability, 
thus defeating an additional disincentive to criminal conduct.126 If the desired result is 
that the corporation and responsible individuals implement proper arrangements or 
correct risky arrangements early, deterrence through criminal liability would be more 
effective than deferred prosecution.
B. Regulatory Solutions
1. Strengthening and Reforming the Current Regulations
In addition to criminal prosecution, regulations can also be set up to provide a 
deterrent effect through the threat of penalties. For regulatory penalties to effectively 
deter executives from instituting flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements, 
participating in them, or ignoring flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements 
put in place by others, the penalties must be proportionately punitive, appropriately 
triggered, and practically enforceable.
                                                          
122 Id.; see Griffin, supra note 120, at 321 (describing deferred prosecution agreements as 
“a form of probation, or ‘pretrial diversion,’ according to which the government agrees to 
suspend charges against a company so long as the company fulfills every obligation set forth . 
. . .”).
123 See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-
corps.PDF; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Heads of Dep’t Components (Jan. 20, 2003),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003
jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Griffin, supra note 120, at 323 (noting 
that deferred prosecutions are “not a new device, but they were rarely pursued in corporate 
criminal cases until the Thompson Memorandum encouraged their use as an alternative to 
indictment.” (footnotes omitted)).
124 See Greenblum, supra note 121, at 1864.
125 See Griffin, supra note 120, at 333 (stating that corporations “can use deferred 
prosecution combined with individual culpability as a public relations tool to distance the 
corporation itself from the employee offenders.”); Vinegrad, supra note 120, at A28 (noting 
that deferred prosecution provides “another means by which a corporation that has engaged in 
criminal wrongdoing can ultimately avoid the stigma and collateral consequences of a 
conviction.”).
126 BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL 83 (2016) (noting that from 2001 to 2012, only 
eighty-nine individuals were prosecuted out of 255 deferred or non-prosecution agreements).
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The most recently proposed rule by the financial Agencies is an improvement over 
the 2011 proposed rule, as it includes a clawback provision.127 The threat of the bank 
recovering compensation from an executive in the event of undesirable outcomes 
could serve to de-incentivize an executive from turning a blind eye to risky incentive-
based compensation arrangements, as long as the clawbacks are triggered both if the 
executive himself is awarded compensation via these arrangements and if he is in a 
position to know about the existence of these arrangements. However, in order to be 
effective, the amount of money subject to clawback must be proportionately punitive 
to the executive. If only a small percentage of an executive’s pay is subject to loss due 
to undesirable outcomes, the executive may believe the profits that might result from 
the risky behavior outweigh the risk (or even the actual loss) of that amount. 
Additionally, if the clawback is to be truly punitive, vested compensation should be 
subject to clawback—the loss of unvested compensation is felt significantly less, as it 
is money that has not truly been “paid out” yet.128 Further, putting clawback provisions 
into an executive’s employment contract can make the threat of clawback much more 
direct and, therefore, produce more of a deterrent effect.129 The likelihood of 
enforcement when clawback provisions are contained in employment contracts and 
not just in regulations is greater.130
Deferral and forfeiture can serve similar goals as clawback provisions by reducing 
risk-taking behavior through putting part of an executive’s pay at stake.131 Although 
the 2016 proposed rule includes these tools,132 for a true deterrent effect, the deferral 
period must be longer than suggested by the rule, which currently has a period of three 
years.133 A longer deferral period in which unvested awards are subject to forfeiture 
will help align the executive’s interest with those of the shareholders and the market 
at large,134 and the executive will in turn be motivated to align policy carried out by 
lower-level employees with those interests.
                                                          
127 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37805, § 42.7(c) (proposed 
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42).
128 See Prins, supra note 84 (noting that Stumpf’s exit payout is a “plush parachute,” as his 
only penance was forfeiting stock he did not even fully own yet).
129 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in 
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 420–
21 (2009) (discussing writing clawback provisions directly into employment contracts as a
“bottom-up” approach to reform rather than the “top-down approach” of regulatory reform).
130 Id. at 421–22.
131 See Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt 
Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813, 3813 (2011) (arguing that large deferred compensation 
plans for top managers might cause them to manage their companies conservatively, “avoiding
risk and preserving liquidity . . . .”).
132 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37680.
133 Id.
134 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 129, at 392 (arguing that executive focus on short-term 
performance “often leads to opportunistic behavior, at the expense of the long-term health of 
the company.”); Rebecca A. Crawford, Note, Corporate Governance Reform: How to Promote 
the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 905, 923 (2009) 
(stating that “slowly vesting stock options will incentivize directors and executives to focus on 
the long-term health of their corporations.”).
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2. Increased Regulatory Effectiveness Through Cooperative Governance
However, for these strengthened regulations to have any effect, they must be both 
enforceable and actually enforced.135 Currently, the bodies charged with oversight of 
incentive arrangements of financial institutions are the group of financial Agencies 
that promulgated the 2011 and 2016 proposed rules on incentive-based compensation 
arrangements and, to a more general degree, the CFPB.136 These watchdogs are 
relatively small in comparison to the size and resources of the financial institutions 
they are watching.137 However, dramatically increasing the size of the regulatory 
bodies simply is not feasible.138 Instead, the regulations should be made more 
effectively enforceable by emphasizing strategies that ensure companies are truly 
taking steps to monitor risks posed by their incentive-based compensation schemes 
and are not superficially complying for the sake of meeting the requirement.139 Two 
forms of self-regulation could be useful in this regard: “partial” self-regulation, in 
which the financial institution engages in rulemaking, and “full” self-regulation, in 
which the financial institution engages in both rulemaking and enforcement.140
3. Institution-Designed Regulations
A more interactive regulatory scheme can benefit both institutions and 
consumers.141 If financial institutions are allowed to ensure that their incentive-based 
                                                          
135 An additional consideration is the moral hazard that results when the government bails 
out risk-taking institutions, leading to those in a position to expose the company to risks to do 
so with perceived impunity. See Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts 
Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 
2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371, 419 (2010); see also Ronald 
M. Giammarino et al., An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation, 48 J. FIN. 1523, 1524 
(1993) (stating that “in practice, monitoring is only imperfectly informative, and regulators are 
often unable or unwilling to act on the information they receive.”).
136 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed 
Apr. 14, 2011).
137 See Davidson, supra note 79.
138 See Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Private Sector’s Role in Deterring Corporate 
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 93, 94, 96 (1997) (stating that because the 
government is unlikely to increase its resources, in policing financial sectors “there has been 
and must continue to be a shared responsibility [between the government and the private 
sector].”).
139 See Krawiec, supra note 93, at 487, 491 (arguing that many internal compliance 
structures “do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-
dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability,” leading to 
an under-deterrence of corporate misconduct and a proliferation of costly—but arguably 
ineffective—internal compliance structures.).
140 See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, in 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 115 (M.D.A. 
Freeman ed., 2002).
141 See generally Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1309, 1309 (2015) (proposing that gaps in regulation can be filled by allowing the regulated 
entity to choose how to meet the regulation standard and more closely align the goals of the 
regulators and the regulated).
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compensation schemes comply with the regulations through methods designed largely 
by the institution and approved by their regulating bodies, companies will be less 
likely to expend their resources designing compliance programs that are solely in 
places to jump through the hoops of the regulations.142 Alternatively, regulation could 
be designed at an industry level, or even firm-by-firm, by a panel of individuals with 
experience in the financial industry, as a modified form of self-regulation,143 which 
would help cure problems caused by high levels of complexity in the financial sector 
and the regulatory agencies’ inability to effectively account for that complexity. 
Regulations formulated primarily by the financial institution would internalize some 
of the costs of promulgating rules formerly borne by the agencies or at least reduce 
them by cutting down on the costs of research.144 However, such regulation would 
require governmental oversight to ensure that the industry-designed rules are not self-
serving, as compared to rules designed by outsiders.
4. Institution-Enforced Regulations
A similar idea involves creating an independent body charged with oversight of 
compensation arrangements and comprised of individuals who work in the financial 
industry. This body would not be a substitute for government regulation, but rather an 
addition to maximize efficiency and oversight.145 A specialized committee like this 
would be able to monitor financial institutions efficiently because of its familiarity 
with and knowledge of the industry (as opposed to bodies with a broad range of areas 
for which they are responsible for monitoring).146 This form of self-regulation would 
reduce an institution’s ability to shield itself from penalties through risk-management 
measures that are merely put in place for the sake of compliance; a committee made 
up of industry insiders could effectively see through the sham.
Although this proposal presents the threat of insiders protecting each other or 
engaging in “back-scratching” that could undermine the effectiveness of such a 
                                                          
142 See Bowman, supra note 112, at 674–75; see also John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-
Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1470–71
(1982) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation] (arguing for a form of “enforced 
self-regulation” in which the government would compel a company to write a set of rules 
“tailored to the unique set of contingencies facing that firm.”); Krawiec, supra note 93, at 493 
(explaining that to comply with traditional regulations, companies “are forced to adopt costly 
additional internal compliance structures in order to avoid the risk of harsh penalties when 
violations occur . . . .”).
143 See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as a Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry 
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 470–80 (2011) (proposing “embedded self-regulation” 
in the financial sector as an addition to governmental regulation, encouraging participation by 
lowering the costs of compliance).
144 See Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation, supra note 142, at 1471.
145 Id.; see Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J. Lad, Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, 
Organizational, and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 416, 417 (1983) (discussing a 
system in which industry self-regulation is auxiliary or complementary to governmental 
regulation).
146 See Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation, supra note 142, at 1469 (arguing that “[t]he 
power of corporate inspectors to trap suspected wrongdoers is often greater than that possessed 
by government investigators.”).
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committee,147 certain measures can ensure that self-regulation is truly in the interest of 
the public. For example, the self-regulating body will likely need to report to 
governmental regulating bodies frequently to encourage transparency and 
accountability and to allow the government to step in if the reports indicate emerging 
systemic risks.148 Finally, banks may embrace the ability to regain public trust by 
participating in a form of self-policing, thereby furthering consumer confidence and 
enjoying positive publicity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without intervention, flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements will 
continue to expose financial institutions and the public to serious risks. Instituting the 
threat of more serious penalties imposed by regulations, creating regulations that 
encourage more than mere superficial compliance, and pursuing criminal prosecution 
where appropriate can halt the current trend of incentive-based compensation 
arrangements that encourage risky employee behavior at financial institutions. Current 
and proposed regulations and increasingly lax prosecution are inadequate because they 
do not offer enough of a deterrent effect, a theory of punishment that could prove more 
successful than others in the realm of white-collar crime.
Incentive-based arrangements are standard procedure in many large companies, so 
a company is practically required to offer them to attract the most desirable workers 
in a competitive environment.149 Incentive systems also serve independent goals that 
benefit shareholders and the public, such as rewarding profit maximization and 
encouraging a healthy economy through strong markets. If properly implemented and 
maintained, incentive-based systems can offer significant benefits that make them 
worthwhile, which would mean improving these systems rather than outlawing them 
entirely is desirable.
The government should prosecute executives responsible for incentive-based 
compensation arrangements that they know to be flawed and that result in fraudulent 
employee behavior at the expense of consumers. As articulated by the Sentencing 
Guidelines, the threat of short but certain jail time will have a true deterrent effect on 
potential white-collar offenders. Because these crimes generally occur over a 
relatively long period of time and involve a series of deliberate, thoughtful decisions, 
                                                          
147 For a discussion of problems with self-interest and independence in oversight groups, 
see William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439 
(2003).
148 See Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: 
A Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS 443,
465, 473 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (stating that business self-
regulation works best when those responsible for it know “not only that poor performance will 
trigger sanctions, but also that if business institutions systematically fail to achieve regulatory 
objectives, a more vigorous regulatory shotgun [governmental intervention] waits in the 
wings.”); Omarova, supra note 143, at 485–86 (arguing that industry self-regulation “requires 
that the government agency overseeing the self-regulation process maintain the strong capacity 
for investigation of potential malfeasance by private actors and enforcement of legal and 
regulatory requirements.” (footnote omitted)).
149 Catherine Oak, Ten Ways to Attract and Retain Great Employees, INS. J. (July 7, 2003),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-mindyourbiz/2003/07/07/30612.htm.
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white-collar crime is uniquely suited for achieving effective deterrence through 
punishment.
More punitive clawbacks to vested compensation, longer deferral periods, and 
reformed regulatory structures would offer those in responsible positions at financial 
institutions an incentive both to monitor incentive-based compensation strategies for 
potential risk exposure and put a stop to those that expose the institution to significant 
risk. This would work to align the interests of executives with the interests of 
shareholders, as well as protect the consumer.
Further, the regulations will be more effective and foster benefits for the institution 
as well as the consumer if they allow the institutions to work with the government in 
creating the rules. If banks can tailor their monitoring and reporting of incentive-based 
compensation arrangements, they can save money because compliance will be more 
realistic and responsive to the unique demands of the financial sector and less likely 
to be merely superficial compliance. Additionally, the government can use the 
expertise of industry leaders and save on regulatory resources.
An independent oversight body made up of industry insiders, in addition to 
government watchdogs, is another form of interactive governance that could benefit 
the industry. Keeping in mind the threat of industry executives turning the other way 
to protect their own interests, a specialized oversight committee would be able to 
detect potentially risky trends caused by compensation arrangements before they 
result in harm to the consumer. A reduction in flawed incentive-based compensation 
arrangements at large financial institutions will result in better working environments 
for employees, sustainable long-term profitability for shareholders, and a more stable 
economy. For our banking system to function, the public must regain trust in its 
financial institutions.150 Banks have historically been pillars of the community and a
symbol of stability,151 and if bank executives continue to pursue the goal of 
maximizing profit at any cost, banks will never regain their place of trust in society. 
Banks should make profits—this is the proper purpose of a corporation.152 However, 
they must not lose sight of the vital role of public trust in this endeavor. In order to 
ensure the stability of our economy as a whole, the government must step in to put an 
end to flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements.
                                                          
150 See Steve Denning, How Can Bankers Recover Our Trust?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/02/06/will-we-ever-trust-bankers-
again/#14707ece377d (noting that “trust is the very foundation of banking” and that trust in 
banks is historically low in recent years as a result of banks’ single-minded pursuit of “bad 
profits” at the expense of the best interest of customers).
151 Id.
152 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasizing that “[a] 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); 
but see James R. Barth et al., Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of 
Broad Banking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191–204 (2000).
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